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Abstract. We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approxi-
mately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider
markets with m indivisible items and n buyers. The goal is to set prices
to the items so that, when agents purchase their most demanded sets
simultaneously, no conflicts arise and the obtained allocation has nearly
optimal welfare. For gross substitutes valuations, it is well known that
it is possible to achieve optimal welfare in this manner. We ask: can one
achieve approximately efficient outcomes for valuations beyond gross sub-
stitutes? We show that even for submodular valuations, and even with
only two buyers, one cannot guarantee an approximation better than
Ω(
√
m). The same lower bound holds for the class of single-minded buy-
ers as well. Beyond the negative results on welfare approximation, our
results have daunting implications on revenue approximation for these
valuation classes: in order to obtain good approximation to the collected
revenue, one would necessarily need to abandon the common approach
of comparing the revenue to the optimal welfare; a fundamentally new
approach would be required.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial markets are a canonical setting in which economic and computa-
tional theory collide. In a combinatorial market scenario, a variety of indivisible
and heterogeneous goods are to be allocated among buyers with idiosyncratic
and potentially complex preferences over subsets. A natural economic goal is to
find (and implement) allocations that are efficient, meaning that the total value
generated by the allocation is maximized. Over the past decade, the algorithmic
mechanism design community has made a concerted effort to understand the
interplay between the requirement of aligning buyer incentives (from economics)
and the tool of approximation (from computer science) in the context of this
welfare maximization problem.
An important observation from economic theory is that, in many scenarios,
markets can be resolved using a very simple instrument: item prices. Rather
than execute an auction or other mechanism, one sets an appropriate price for
each good and allow buyers to select their favorite bundles. Indeed, this is the
strategy employed by most retail outlets in the western world, even in scenarios
where items are truly heterogeneous (e.g., antique stores). This prevelance can
be attributed to the natural and distributed manner in which buyers can respond
to prices posted by a seller.
In markets with limited supply, a desirable property of item prices is that
each buyer can simultaneously obtain her most demanded set. That is, no item is
overdemanded at the specified prices. This is a natural market fairness criterion,
and (as argued elsewhere [10]) is important for maintaining buyer satisfaction.
Following [6], we will say that a choice of prices is stable if it satisfies this
fairness condition. When each buyer wants at most a single item, this property
is analogous to envy-freeness (no buyer prefers another’s outcome to her own).
Hence, for unit-demand buyers, stable prices are equivalent to envy-free prices
[10].
It is well known that when each buyer wants at most a single item (i.e., unit-
demand preferences), or when the value a buyer derives from an item is indepen-
dent of what other items she is allocated (i.e., additive preferences), there always
exist stable prices for which the resulting market outcome achieves optimal effi-
ciency [18]. This is referred to as a Walrasian (or competitive) equilibrium. Such
prices exist more generally for the class of gross substitutes preferences [12]. This
class includes all additive and unit-demand valuations, but is strictly contained
in the class of submodular valuations. To summarize, when buyers have gross
substitutes valuations, item pricing can efficiently resolve a market.
In this work we study the power of stable item prices to approximate welfare
when valuations do not satisfy the gross substitutes condition. It is known that
for any class of valuations beyond gross substitutes, there exist instances for
which no stable prices can clear the market in an optimally efficient assignment
[9]. We ask: for what classes of buyer preferences do there exist prices that gener-
ate approximately efficient outcomes, when buyers select their utility-maximizing
sets? Is it possible to recover a constant fraction of the optimal welfare when
buyer valuations are, for example, submodular?
1.1 Our results
It might not come at a surprise that item prices are not sufficient to obtain
high welfare if items are complementary. After all, if items have value only when
sold together, then it seems intuitive to bundle (rather than setting individual
prices). Perhaps more surprisingly, we also show that a polynomial gap may exist
even if all valuations are submodular. This is despite the existential nature of
the question, which carries the assumption that buyer types are publicly known.
Even for two buyers with submodular valuations, there may not exist prices that
attain any reasonable approximation to the optimal welfare. Crucially, these
lower bounds do not stem from computational considerations, but rather are
existential. That is, stable item prices necessarily provide a poor approximation
for welfare.
Main Result: There exists an instance with two buyers with submodular valu-
ations, such that there does not exist a stable outcome that obtains better than
an Ω(
√
m)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
The result is formulated for the objective of welfare maximization. A differ-
ent, and also very natural, objective is seller revenue, which has been extensively
studied in the literature on the design of revenue-maximizing envy-free prices
[2,4,5,11]. Although our results do not have a direct implication for the revenue
objective, as far as we are aware, all existing methods for approximating envy-
free revenue proceed by comparing to the benchmark of optimal welfare. An
implication of our result is that such an approach cannot generalize to submod-
ular valuations and beyond. Since the welfare generated via stable prices cannot
approximate optimal welfare, certainly the revenue from stable prices cannot ap-
proximate this benchmark either. Any approximation analysis for the revenue of
stable prices for submodular valuations would therefore require a fundamentally
new approach.
These negative results may lead one to suspect that a super-constant lower
bound is unavoidable for any valuation class beyond gross substitutes, even for
two buyers (similar in spirit to the result of [9], showing that the class of gross
substitutes valuations is maximal with respect to Walrasian equilibrium exis-
tence). In Appendix B we show that this is not the case: for two budget-additive
buyers, there always exists a set of item prices that achieves a quarter of the
optimal welfare.
We also consider single-minded valuations, for which we give a lower bound
of Ω(
√
m). For this case, a matching upper bound of O(
√
m) follows from the
results in [5]. These results are obtained via an analysis of the configuration LP
and its dual.
Techniques. Our lower bound construction is based upon a connection between
the existence of Walrasian prices and the integrality gap of the configuration
LP for a market, but requires new ideas. In particular, a simple configuration
LP argument presented in [6] showing a lower bound of Ω(m) for the broader
class of fractionally subadditive valuations completely fails for the class of sub-
modular valuations. One reason is that the example in [6] works by exploiting
the fact that complement-free valuations can have “hidden complementarities:”
a marginal valuation function3 of a complement-free valuation (i.e., the extra
value derived from additional items on top of a fixed set of items) is not neces-
sarily complement-free. One might therefore guess that submodular valuations,
which do not exhibit such hidden complementarities [13], might overcome this
lower bound and yield a constant approximation. Another reason is that the ex-
ample from [6] uses symmetric valuation functions, but symmetric submodular
functions are gross substitutes [9], and thus lower bounds based on symmetric
constructions cannot apply.
1.2 Related work
Our work is related to the literature on algorithmic pricing [10], which studies the
problem of setting envy-free item prices in full-information settings. This work
3 Formally, given a valuation v on a set of items M and a set S ⊆ M , the marginal
valuation of a set T ⊆M \ S is defined by v(T |S) = v(T ∪ S)− v(S).
focuses mainly on algorithms for finding prices that approximately maximize the
seller’s revenue, assuming that buyers are unit-demand4 [2,4,5,11].
One motivation for our work is the non-existence of Walrasian equilibrium
in general combinatorial markets. Characterizations of existence of Walrasian
equilibria were studied in, for example, [1,12,15,3,9]. Extensions of envy-free
pricing for valuation classes beyond gross substitutes were studied in [17,7], but
whereas we focus on item prices those works consider more general payment
rules that assign prices to bundles of goods.
Our model can be viewed as a relaxation of the notion of Walrasian equilib-
rium, where we do not insist that all items are sold. A similar relaxation was
recently considered in [6], showing that if, in addition to our relaxation, one
can also bundle items into packages prior to setting prices, then at least half of
the optimal social welfare can be obtained for arbitrary valuations. Our nega-
tive result provides additional motivation for such a bundling operation. Indeed,
our results illustrate that insisting on outcomes that simultaneously satisfy the
demands of all agents, using item prices, can prevent a good approximation to
social welfare. The results of [6] show that this difficulty can also be circumvented
via bundling.
A different relaxation of Walrasian equilibrium was presented in [8]. In their
equilibrium notion, no buyer wishes to add additional items to his allocation
(but might prefer a non-superset of their current allocation). This can be viewed
as a partial relaxation of the buyer-side equilibrium constraints in a Walrasian
equilibrium. In contrast, our approach is to relax the seller-side constraint that
all items must be sold.
2 Model and Preliminaries
The setting considered in this work consists of a set M of m indivisible objects
and a set of n buyers. Each buyer has a valuation function vi(·) : 2M → R≥0
that indicates his value for every set of objects. As standard, we assume that
valuations are monotone non-decreasing (i.e., vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆
M) and are normalized so that vi(∅) = 0. The profile of buyer valuations is
denoted by v = (v1, . . . , vn).
An allocation ofM is a vector of setsX = (X0, X1, . . . , Xn), whereXi denotes
the bundle assigned to buyer i, for i ∈ [n], and X0 is the set of unallocated
objects; i.e., X0 =M \∪i∈[n]Xi. It is required that Xi ∩Xk = ∅ for every i 6= k.
The social welfare of an allocation X is SW(X) =
∑n
i=1 vi(Xi), and the optimal
welfare is denoted by OPT. An allocation X gives an α-approximation for the
social welfare if SW(X) ≥ (1/α) ·OPT. A price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) consists
of a price pj for each object j ∈M . As standard, we assume that each buyer has
a quasi-linear utility function; i.e., the utility of buyer i being allocated bundle
Xi under prices p is ui(Xi,p) = vi(Xi)−
∑
j∈Xi
pj .
4 Note that, for unit-demand buyers, envy-freeness is equivalent to our notion of sta-
bility.
Given prices p = (p1, . . . , pm), the demand correspondence Di(p) of buyer i
contains the sets of objects that maximize buyer i’s utility:
Di(p) =
{
S∗ : S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆M
{ui(S,p)}
}
.
An allocation Xi is optimal for buyer i with respect to prices p if Xi ∈ Di(p).
A tuple (X,p) is said to be stable if for every buyer i, Xi is optimal for i with
respect to p. We will sometimes refer to such a tuple as a stable outcome. We
refer to a pricing p as being stable if there exists a supporting allocation X such
that (X,p) is stable.
2.1 Characterization
In this section, we present a characterization of stable outcomes. This character-
ization makes use of the configuration linear program (LP), which encodes the
problem of maximizing social welfare over all fractional allocations of a combi-
natorial market. The configuration LP is given by the following linear program:
max
∑
i,S
vi(S) · xi,S
s.t.
∑
S⊆M
x
i,S
≤ 1 for every i ∈ N
∑
i,S∋j
x
i,S
≤ 1 for every j ∈M
x
i,S
∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ N,S ⊆M (1)
It was shown in [16] that a Walrasian Equilibrium exists if and only if the
integrality gap of the configuration LP is 1. Since, by definition, an outcome
is stable if and only if it is a WE over the set of items that it allocates, A
straightforward corollary of that result is as follows:
Corollary 1. For any M ′ ⊆M , there exists a stable tuple (X,p) with ⋃iXi =
M ′ iff the configuration LP restricted to the items in M ′ has integrality gap 1.
2.2 Valuation Classes
The following hierarchy of complement-free valuation classes have been studied
extensively in the literature.
– v is additive if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊂M .
– v is XOS if there exists a collection of additive functions A1(·), . . . , Ak(·)
such that for every set S ⊆M , v(S) = max1≤i≤k Ai(S).
– v is submodular if for every two sets S ⊆ T ⊆M and item j ∈M , v(j|T ) ≤
v(j|S) (where v(j|S) := v(S ∪ {j})− v(S) for every set S ⊆M).
– v is budget additive if there is a value B ≥ 0: v(S) = min{∑j∈S v({j}), B}
for every set S ⊆M .
These valuations exhibit the following hierarchy: additive ⊂ budget additive
⊂ submodular ⊂ XOS, where all containments are strict. See [13] for a detailed
discussion.
3 Submodular Valuations
The following theorem, which is the main result of the paper, shows that even
for two submodular buyers, a large gap in welfare might be unavoidable in stable
outcomes.
Theorem 1. There exists an instance with two buyers with submodular valua-
tions, such that there does not exist a stable outcome that obtains better than
Ω(
√
m)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Before going into the details of the proofs, let us provide a high-level
description of our approach. By Corollary 1, we wish to construct a pair of
submodular valuations for which the configuration LP has integrality gap strictly
greater than 1, even as items are removed from the market, unless almost all
items are removed. We begin by considering an instance that is not submodular,
but that has this desired property. We will use an example from [6], in which
agent 1 is XOS and agent 2 is unit-demand. A key property of this example is
that the XOS agent always wants all items and the unit-demand agent always
wants exactly one item. Our approach will be to massage these valuations into
a pair of submodular functions, while retaining the lower bounds.
Call the original two valuations v1 and v2. Our first idea is to make the
functions submodular by adding a very large, strictly concave function h to each
of v1 and v2. This will make the contribution of v1 and v2 to the social welfare
negligible by comparison, but recall that a stable outcome exists only if the
integrality gap is exactly one, so it is enough for even a tiny component of the
welfare to be improvable via fractional allocation.
Unfortunately, this modification ruins the properties of the original exam-
ple. Specifically, because of the concavity of h, the optimal assignment divides
all items equally between the players, and this does not align with the origi-
nal example. We therefore apply an additional trick: we divide the items into√
m equal-sized buckets, and implement the original example on each bucket
separately.
We now begin with the formal proof, which requires some preparation. Define
h(z) = z +
∑z
i=1 1/i. Function h is symmetric, submodular, and satisfies the
following property.
Claim. For every set function f(·), there is a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that
the function v(S) = h(|S|) + ǫ · f(S) is submodular for any ε ≥ ǫ ≥ 0.
Proof. In order to ensure that v(·) is submodular we show below that marginal
values are decreasing. Let S1 ( S2. We need to ensure that
v(S1 ∪ {i})− v(S1) ≥ v(S2 ∪ {i})− v(S2).
This inequality for a fixed ǫ is equivalent to the following
1
|S1|+1 −
1
|S2|+1 ≥ ǫ · (f(S2 ∪ {i})− f(S2)− f(S1 ∪ {i}) + f(S1))
We observe that the left hand side of the last inequality has a lower bound of
1
(n+1)(n+2) and the right hand side has an upper bound of 2ǫ · maxS⊆[n] f(S).
Therefore, the inequality holds true for any ǫ < ε = 12(n+1)(n+2)maxS⊆[n] f(S) . ⊓⊔
We are now ready to construct our valuations. Consider an instance with 2
buyers and m = k2 items for some integer k > 0. Suppose that the k2 items are
partitioned into k buckets, B1, . . . , Bk, where |Bi|= k for every i = 1, . . . , k.
The valuation functions of the buyers are as follows. Define XOS(S) = |S|
for every S such that |S|> 1, and XOS(S) = 2 if |S|= 1. The valuation function
of the first buyer is given by
v1(S) = h(|S|) + ε · f1(S), where f1(S) = max
j=1,...,k
XOS(S ∩Bj).
We now turn to the second buyer. Let Unit(S) = 1 − 1
k
for every S such that
|S|≥ 1 (and 0 if S = ∅). Note Unit(S) is a symmetric unit-demand function.
The valuation function of the second buyer is given by
v2(S) = h(|S|) + ε · f2(S), where f2(S) =
k∑
j=1
Unit(S ∩Bj).
By Claim 3, we can take sufficiently small ε such that both valuation functions
v1(·) and v2(·) are submodular.
Recall that our solution concept allows for some items to be unsold. Our
next argument is similar in spirit to the argument for XOS valuations given in
[6] (see Appendix A). Let K denote the set of items sold. The maximum of
h(S) + h(K \ S) is attained when |S| is as close to |K|/2 as possible. Therefore,
for a sufficiently small ε any integral allocation that maximizes v1(S)+v2(K \S)
must divide items equally among two buyers (up to a single item). Among these,
the optimal integral allocation is one that maximizes f1(S)+ f2(K \S). We can
now show that if K is not too small, then a stable outcome cannot exist.
Claim. If |K|≥ 4k, then there exists a fractional allocation that does strictly
better than the optimal integral allocation.
Proof. Suppose that |K|≥ 4k. Without loss of generality let B1 be the bucket
with the largest number of sold items, say t. We note that the number of items
t in B1 is at least 4.
One can easily verify that the allocation that maximizes f1(S) + f2(K \ S)
is one that assigns all items in B1 to the first buyer, and a single item from
every remaining non-empty bucket to the second buyer. Indeed, this allocation
maximizes the value of f1(·) and almost matches the maximum of f2(·), and
these two cannot be maximized simultaneously. Let S1 and S2 be sets of items
assigned respectively to the first and second buyer in this allocation.We note that
|S1|≤ k and |S2|≤ k−1. Therefore, the remaining at least 4k− (2k−1) = 2k+1
unallocated items can be divided among the two buyers into two sets J1 and
J2 such that buyers receive the same (up to one) number of items, as required.
Thus in the optimal integral allocation the first buyer receives S1 ∪ J1 and the
second buyer receives S2 ∪ J2.
By the characterization given in [16] (see also Section 2.1), this allocation
admits a stable pricing if and only if this is also an optimal fractional allocation.
We next construct a fractional allocation with a higher social welfare.
We observe that |J2|> k, so we can choose T ⊂ J2 such that |T |= |S1|= t.
We recall that t ≥ 4. Let π : S1 → T be a bijection between items in S1 and T .
We consider the following fractional solution {yi,S}:
y1,S1∪J1 =
t− 2
t− 1
y1,{j}∪J1∪T\{π(j)} =
1
t(t− 1) , for each j ∈ S1
y2,{j}∪S2∪J2\{π(j)} =
1
t
, for each j ∈ S1
Let ℓ be the number of nonempty buckets in K. One can easily verify that this
is a feasible solution, and the welfare obtained by {yi,S} is given by
SW (y) = h(|S1 ∪ J1|) + h(|S2 ∪ J2|) + t− 2
t− 1 · f1(S1 ∪ J1)
+
∑
j∈S1
1
t(t− 1) · f1({j} ∪ J1 ∪ T \ {π(j)})
+
∑
j∈S1
1
t
· f2({j} ∪ S2 ∪ J2 \ {π(j)})
≥ h(|S1 ∪ J1|) + h(|S2 ∪ J2|) + t− 2
t− 1 · t
+ |S1|· 1
t(t− 1) · 2 +
1
t
·
∑
j∈S1
f2(j ∪ S2)
= h(|S1 ∪ J1|) + h(|S2 ∪ J2|) + t− 2
t− 1 · t+
2
t− 1 + ℓ ·
(
1− 1
k
)
.
The welfare in the optimal integral allocation x is given by
SW (x) = h(|S1 ∪ J1|) + h(|S2 ∪ J2|) + t+ (ℓ− 1) ·
(
1− 1
k
)
.
It follows that SW (y)− SW (x) ≥ 1− 1
k
− t−2
t−1 > 0. ⊓⊔
We conclude that no allocation of at least 4k items admits a stable outcome.
Now since k =
√
m and v1(S) = Θ(|S|), v2(S) = Θ(|S|), this gives a gap of
Ω(
√
m) in the social welfare, completing the proof of Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
4 Single-Minded Valuations
We now consider buyers with single-minded valuations. A single minded buyer
is interested in a single set and derives no utility from any strict subset of it.
Single minded buyers exhibit strong complementarity between items.
We first present an instance such that there does not exist a stable outcome
that obtains better than Ω(
√
m) approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Readers who are familiar with the NP-hardness of welfare approximation within
a factor Ω(
√
m) for single minded bidders (e.g., [14]) might assume that our
Ω(
√
m) lower bound follows similarly. We reiterate here that our lower bound
is purely existential and is completely independent of computational considera-
tions, and is therefore unrelated to the computational result.
Example 1. Consider a combinatorial auction with n single-minded buyers and
m = n(n−1)2 items. Each item is represented by a pair of integers (a, b) such that
M = {(a, b) | a + b ≤ n, a, b ∈ [n]}. Each buyer i for i ∈ [n − 1] desires a set
S∗i = {(a, b) | a = i or b = n− i, (a, b) ∈M} of size n− 1, for a value of n+1.
Note that |S∗i ∩ S∗k |= 1 for all i 6= k, and every object a ∈ M is contained in at
most 2 sets. Buyer n desires the set of all items, M , for a value of m.
The optimal outcome allocates all objects to buyer n, for a total value of
m. Suppose this optimal outcome can be supported by item prices p. Then∑
a∈M pa ≤ m, but a simple counting argument below demonstrates that∑
a∈S∗
ℓ
pa ≤ n < n+ 1 for some ℓ.
n(n− 1) = 2vn(M) ≥ 2
∑
a∈M
pa ≥
n−1∑
i=1
∑
a∈S∗
i
pa.
Buyer ℓ would demand set S∗ℓ at these prices, a contradiction. Thus, at any
pricing equilibrium, some set S∗ℓ must be allocated to a buyer ℓ; but this implies
that no other set S∗k can be allocated, as S
∗
k ∩ S∗i 6= ∅ for all k 6= i. Thus
the total social welfare at any equilibrium outcome with item prices is at most
n+ 1 = O(
√
m). ⊓⊔
Finally, we note that the last example is essentially the worst possible case.
That is, for every instance of single-minded buyers, there exists a stable outcome
that achieves at least an O(
√
m) approximation to the optimal social welfare.
The latter statement is implied by [5], i.e., the agrument goes through a care-
ful analysis of the configuration LP along with its dual program. In particular,
one can show how to construct a price vector for which (i) no buyer can get
strictly positive utility, and (ii) there exists a fractionally optimal solution in
which all buyers obtain zero utility. Then, a standard greedy algorithm applied
to the buyers in the support of the fractional solution will yield an O(
√
m) ap-
proximation. Since it is not possible for any buyer to obtain strictly positive
utility, this outcome is necessarily stable.
5 Conclusions and Open Problems
This paper studies the problem of resolving combinatorial markets using item
prices and utility-maximizing allocations, with the objective of maximizing eco-
nomic efficiency. We approach the problem through the lens of approximation,
and ask how much social welfare can be obtained using item prices. We establish
negative results, showing that no stable pricing can provide reasonable approxi-
mation to social welfare in several cases of interest. These negative results hold
even for simple complement-free valuations, and even with only two buyers.
Open problems Our model and results leave a number of directions for future
research.
First, we show that even with only two submodular buyers, there is a lower
bound of Ω(
√
m) on the approximation ratio of social welfare. On the positive
side, for gross-substitute buyers there always exists a competitive equilibrium,
i.e., efficient stable pricing. It is left open whether there are subclasses of sub-
modular valuations (such as budget additive or coverage valuations) that admit
constant approximation to optimal welfare. For the case of two consumers with
budget additive valuations we answer this question in the affirmative. However,
for larger instances of budget additive valuations or other valuation classes this
question is left open.
Second, throughout the paper we assume that items are indivisible and het-
erogeneous. It would be an interesting research direction to relax partially these
assumption. For example, one could assume that every item in the market has
a few identical copies and that every buyer does not want more than one copy
of each item. It would be interesting to see how the efficiency of item pricing
depends on the minimal number of item copies. Given our mostly negative re-
sults for valuations with complements, we would like to understand under what
relaxations one can obtain positive results (e.g., constant approximation of the
optimal social welfare) for single-minded buyers.
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APPENDIX
A A lower bound for XOS valuations
For completeness, we present an example from [6], demonstrating a linear gap
in welfare for XOS valuations.
Theorem 2 ([6]). There exists an instance with two buyers with XOS valua-
tions, such that there does not exist a stable outcome that obtains better than
Ω(m) (≥ m/3) approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider an auction with m items and two buyers with the following
symmetric XOS valuations. Buyer 1 is unit-demand and values every subset
at 1/2 − δ, for a sufficiently small δ (that will be determined soon). Buyer 2
values any subset of size k at max(1, k/2); it is easy to verify that this is an
XOS valuation. The socially optimal outcome allocates all objects to the second
buyer for a total value of m/2 when m > 2, and allocates one item to each of the
buyers when m = 2 for a total value of 3/2− δ. We claim that there is no stable
pricing that sells more than two items. For every m > 2, an optimal integral
solution obtains a value of m/2 (by giving all the items to the XOS buyer). By
the characterization given in [16] (see also Section 2.1), this allocation admits
a stable pricing if and only if m/2 is the optimal fractional solution of the
corresponding configuration LP. We will now show a fractional solution that
obtains value greater than m/2 for every δ < 12(m−1) . Consider the fractional
solution in which the allocation of the first (unit demand) buyer is given by
x1,{j} = 1/m for every j ∈ [m], and the allocation of the second (XOS) buyer is
given by x2,{j} =
1
m(m−1) for every j ∈ [m], and x2,[m] = m−2m−1 . One can easily
verify that this is a feasible solution, and the welfare obtained by {xi,S} is given
by SW (x) = m2 +
1
2(m−1) − δ, which is greater than m2 for every δ < 12(m−1) ,
as required. We conclude that a stable outcome can have at most two allocated
object, and thus the highest welfare that can be obtained in a stable allocation
is 3/2− δ, resulting in a linear gap of m/3.
B Two budget additive valuations: an upper bound
It has been shown in the last two sections that for submodular and XOS valu-
ations, one cannot hope for a constant approximation, even for instances with
only two buyers. One may wonder whether this is an unavoidable property of
any valuation beyond gross substitutes. In this section we show that this is still
too early to jump into this conclusion. In particular, for the case of two budget-
additive buyers, constant approximation can be achieved.
A budget-additive valuation of buyer i is specified by budget B and item val-
ues vij for every j ∈M . The value of some set S is then vi(S) = min{B,
∑
j∈S vij}.
Without loss of generality we may assume that for each item j neither v1j ≤ B1,
nor v2j ≤ B2.
Theorem 3. For every instance of two budget-additive buyers, there exists a
stable outcome, which is 4-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Let B1 and B2 denote the budgets of buyers 1 and 2, respectively, and
suppose without loss of generality that B1 ≥ B2. We distinguish between two
cases.
Case 1:
∑
j v1j ≥ B1 (i.e., the value of buyer 1 for the grand bundle exhausts
her budget). In this case, set a price of pj = v1j for every item j. Thus, every
bundle S (including S = ∅) such that ∑j∈S v1j ≥ B1 is in buyer 1’s demand
set (and gives her utility 0). Since v1j ≤ B1 for each j and
∑
j v1j ≥ B1 we can
find a set S1, such that B1 ≥
∑
j∈S1
v1j ≥ B1/2. Any subset of S1 is a demand
set of buyer 1. Let D2 be a bundle in buyer 2’s demand set. We let D2 be the
allocation of buyer 2. We note that
v2(D2) ≥
∑
j∈D2
pj =
∑
j∈D2
v1j .
We let D1 = S1 \D2 be the allocation of buyer 1. We can estimate the social
welfare of this allocation as follows.
SW = v1(D1) + v2(D2) =
∑
j∈S1\D2
v1j + v2(D2)
≥
∑
j∈S1\D2
v1j +
∑
j∈D2
v1j ≥
∑
j∈S1
v1j ≥ B1
2
.
The optimal social welfare is at most B1 +B2, which cannot exceed our SW
by more than a factor of 4.
Case 2:
∑
j v1j < B1. Let S1 = {j : v1j ≥ v2j}, and S2 = {j : v2j > v1j}.
Consider the pricing where pj = v2j for every item j ∈ S1 and pj = v1j for every
item j ∈ S2. Since buyer 2 is indifferent about taking any item from S1, there
exists a set in buyer 2’s demand set that is contained in S2, we call it D2. We
let buyer 2 to be allocated the items in D2 and buyer 1 be allocated the items
in S1 ∪ (S2 \D2). The social welfare SW for this allocation is
SW =
∑
j∈S1
v1j +
∑
j∈S2\D2
v1j +min

∑
j∈D2
v2j , B2

 .
We assume that D2 6= ∅, as otherwise we would have the optimal social
welfare. If v2(D2) + v1(S2 \D2) < B2, then u2(S2) > u2(D2) and we arrive at a
contradiction with the fact that D2 was a demand set of buyer 2. Indeed,
u2(D2) = v2(D2)−
∑
j∈D2
v1j = v2(D2) + v1(S2 \D2)−
∑
j∈S2
v1j
< min

∑
j∈S2
v2j , B2

− ∑
j∈S2
v1j = v2(S2)−
∑
j∈S2
pj = u2(S2)
Therefore, v2(D2) + v1(S2 \D2) ≥ B2, then it also holds that
SW = v1(D1) + v2(D2) + v1(S2 \D2) ≥ B2. (2)
In addition to that, since v2(D2) ≥
∑
j∈D2
pj =
∑
j∈D2
v1j , it follows that
SW = v1(D1) + v2(D2) + v1(S2 \D2) ≥
∑
j∈M
v1j . (3)
Consider the sum of Equations (2) and (3). The left hand side is twice the
social welfare obtained by the suggested allocation, and the right hand side is
B2+
∑
j∈M v1j , which is clearly an upper bound on OPT. It follows that we get
at least 1/2 of the optimal social welfare.
